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Tragedy, like religion, must break the ego, destroying the 
illusory whole of the unified self. – Iris Murdoch
1 
 
he novel begins as follows:  
  
 
Dora Greenfield left her husband because she was afraid 
of him.  She decided six months later to return to him for 
the same reason.  The absent Paul, haunting her with 
letters and telephone bells and imagined footsteps on the 
stairs had begun to be the greater torment.  Dora suffered 
from guilt, and with guilt came fear.  She decided at last 
that the persecution of his presence was to be preferred 
to the persecution of his absence.2  
 
Murdoch’s novel The Bell is about Imber Court.  It is a small Anglican 
religious community of lay people whose lives were transformed, not just by 
the arrival of a couple of dissimilar visitors, not just by the arrival of a new bell 
to be installed at Imber Abbey located beyond the lake, but more significantly 
by the discovery of a centuries-old bell the story of which is engulfed in a 
terrible legend.   
At the very start of the novel, one has a foretaste of a certain 
Murdochian literary motif.  Dora, an unsuccessful middle class art student and 
adulterous wife of Paul, an art historian of noble German descent, draws from 
the same source—fear—the very motive for two distinct acts: of leaving him, 
and returning to him.  From the same feeling of fear proceed two distinct 
movements, of fleeing and returning.  This model remains consistent 
throughout the novel.  Dora and Paul are both engaged in art, but could never 
find common interest to sustain their marriage.  Michael Meade, the leader of 
the lay community, realizes later on in the novel that his religious calling and 
sexual passions spring from the same source.  The two bells of the novel are 
both named Gabriel, one old and one new.  The religious community at Imber 
is one and yet two: The Imber Abbey of the strictly enclosed nuns and the lay 
community of Imber Court.  The latter being for those people who, in the 
                                                 
1 Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (London: Vintage, 2003). 
2 Iris Murdoch, The Bell (London: The Hogarth Press, 1958). 
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words of the Abbess, “can live neither in the world nor out of it,” those 
“unhappy souls” whose “desire for God makes them unsatisfactory citizens of 
an ordinary life, but whose strength or temperament fails them to surrender the 
world completely.”3  This allotropic pattern of a single spring feeding different, 
and sometimes opposing, streams provides the tension for the novel’s plot.4 
This is the fertile ground where the realism of moral and even religious conflict 
germinates in the unfolding of what one may say a “tragic tale.”5 
There is something “un-Murdochian” in a “tragic” reading of her 
novel The Bell.  Firstly, she argues, “[a]ll tragedies are written in poetry.”6   This 
is not to suggest that prose is antinomic to the tragic genre.  Rather, it is 
because for Murdoch, “only great poetry can raise language to the pitch of 
clarified moral intensity which enables it to display the horrors of human life in 
dramatic form.”7 Indeed, classical Greek and Shakespearean tragedies are 
molded in the highly judicious rules of versification and composed rhetoric for 
audience impact.  Secondly, though Murdoch speaks greatly on the concept of 
tragedy as exemplified in general literature in her philosophical works, one may 
doubt whether she really considers her own novels, or at least some of her 
published works, as exemplifying the tragic genre.  Though in the eyes of the 
public she is a philosopher-novelist where the two adjectives appear closely 
interlaced, it is remarkable to hear her say, “I don’t think philosophy influences 
my work as a novelist.”8 Nowadays, there is hardly any Murdoch reader who 
shares her view on this.  Thirdly, and specifically dealing with the novel, there 
is something intricately contrived in a “tragic” reading of The Bell; more so 
because I argue that in this philosophical and psychological novel, we discover, 
in the early part of her academic career, a gradual disclosure of the eclipse, or 
the  substitution, of God in her thought.  No one doubts the importance 
Murdoch gives to the religious dimension, both in her literary and 
philosophical works, but the striking character in her Platonic retrieval of the 
moral and the religious logically, and tragically, involves a certain “twilight of 
the gods,” what one may call, the “tragedy of the divine,” that is, displacing 
God in order to retrieve the Good.9 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 82. 
4 Other illustrations may include: Toby ended up sleeping a few minutes after he said he 
wasn’t feeling sleepy. Ibid., 156.  Also the description of the fraternal twins, Nick and Catherine: 
“It was indeed strange that God could have made two creatures so patently from the same 
substance and yet in making them so alike made them so different.” Cf. ibid., 111.  Talking about 
spiritual powers, it “was indeed like electricity in that it was thoroughly dangerous.  It could 
perform miracles of good: it could also bring about destruction.” Ibid., 113.   
5 That The Bell is a tragedy, in particular in relation to the death of Nick Fawley, is also 
shared by A.  S.  Byatt.  See Degrees of Freedom (London: Vintage, 1965), 111-12. 
6 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 116. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Michael O.  Bellamy, “An Interview with Iris Murdoch,” in Contemporary Literature, 18:2 
(1977), 131. 
9 It is interesting to note that Don Cupitt’s Taking Leave of God starts with the same 
allotropic pattern in speaking of the “eclipse of God” in contemporary culture.  “‘I can’t live 
with it and I can’t live without it.’ Such is the verdict of many people upon traditional religious 
belief.” Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God (London: SCM Press, 1980), 1.  
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I wish not to go into details on the life of Murdoch, the historical 
events that unfolded in her purview, and how these contributed to the 
development of her thought.  Suffice it to say, she lived in an age that she 
characteristically calls as the “untheological time.”10 Her Platonic retrieval of 
the Good is an urgent response to the steady fragmentation of the human 
identity in search of meaning and purpose.  Technological and scientific 
advancement overcomes the modern subject.  Humanity is overwhelmed and 
defeated by totalitarian forms of political ideology, ultimately becoming 
alienated from the religious sense of God.  The novel echoes these three 
domains: (i) the debate to purchase the mechanical cultivator in order to 
improve productivity of the market garden; (ii) the tacit requirement of “fitting 
in” to which Dora and Nick find little inclination; and (iii) the final 
acquiescence of Michael’s faith, broken by a single blow, that “real faith in God 
was something utterly remote” from him.11  Murdoch calls this “the current 
view” of her time. 
The ultimate question, according to Murdoch, takes the form, “What 
does it mean to be good?” Or, in the words of the two homilies given at Imber 
Court: What is the “chief requirement of the good life?”12  It is to this question 
that all her philosophical and literary oeuvres are weaved as hoped response in 
the retrieval of the moral life. 
 
Moral Vision over Moral Understanding 
 
  In the first chapter of the novel, we find Dora, the estranged wife, 
inside a tightly packed train as she travels to Gloucester to rejoin her estranged 
husband who is temporarily staying in an Anglican Benedictine abbey doing 
research on an old medieval manuscript owned by the religious community.  At 
one point in her travel, an elderly woman entered the carriage and started 
having a conversation with another old lady seated beside Dora, obviously her 
companion who was fortunate enough to find an empty seat.  The novel reads: 
 
Dora stopped listening because a dreadful thought had 
struck her.  She ought to give up her seat.  She rejected 
the thought, but it came back.  There was no doubt about 
it.  The elderly lady looked very frail indeed, and it was 
only proper that Dora, who was young and healthy, 
should give her seat to the lady who could then sit next to 
her friend.  Dora felt the blood rushing to her face.  She 
sat still and considered the matter.13 
 
                                                 
10 Quoted in Iris Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, ed. 
by  Peter Conradi (New York: Penguin, 1999).   
11 Murdoch, The Bell, 312. 
12 Cf. ibid., 132ff, 201ff. 
13 Ibid., 16.  
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A series of ponderings followed that involved the consideration of the 
other man seated near them who might offer his own seat, the thought of her 
proper reward for having arrived early and hence deserving the seat, the 
consideration of the other passengers in the carriage, none of whom “looked in 
the least uneasy.” Their heads were buried in books, reflecting a “selfish glee” 
that Dora herself may have also shared.   
The narration continues, 
 
“The old lady would be perfectly all right in the corridor.  
The corridor was full of old ladies anyway, and no one 
else seemed bothered by this, least of all the old ladies 
themselves! Dora hated pointless sacrifices.  She was tired 
after her recent emotions and deserved a rest.  Besides, it 
would never do to arrive at her destination exhausted.   
She regarded her state of distress as completely neurotic.  
She decided not give up her seat. 
          She got up and said to the standing lady, ‘Do seat 
down here, please.  I’m not going very far, and I’d much 
rather stand anyway’.”14 
 
Such moral deliberations, of which the novel is interspersed in almost 
every page, mirror Murdoch’s deft style of running the psychological scalpel 
into the minutiae of moral consciousness.  Dora was not being indecisive or 
erratic.  Despite the care taken to think through the ethical requirements of 
civility, there is always something in the imperative of goodness that is not 
reducible to rational discussions.   
Iris Murdoch is reacting against the prevailing philosophic tendencies 
in Britain during her time.  Subjectivity is reduced to what Charles Taylor later 
calls the “punctual self,” the self as free and independent yet, cultureless, 
ahistorical and dreadfully solitary.15 T h e  m o d e r n  i d e n t i t y  i s  s t r i p p e d  o f  i t s  
colour and texture.  It is the consideration of the subject where we let “the 
notion of ‘experience’ drop out of sight altogether.”16 She argues that the chief 
feature of the modern dilemma is that “we have been left with far too shallow 
and flimsy idea of human personality.”17 In her view “the dilemma of 
modernity is precisely a dwindling, a narrowing of vision, a reduction in 
philosophic ambition and moral resources.”18 This is most evident in moral 
philosophy where the opulence of human experience is trimmed down to bare 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 17. 
15 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1989), 159ff. 
16 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 43. 
17 Ibid., 287. 
18 Michael Levenson, “Iris Murdoch: The Philosophic Fifties and The Bell,” in Modern 
Fiction Studies, 47:3 (2001), 561.  
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essentials, to mere behaviour and public expression.  The inwardness of 
experience is denuded.19 
Morality is reduced to a function of making choices; of deliberations 
founded on certain principles that we take simpliciter, lacking in any 
metaphysical or even religious grounding.  “We study the facts, and we make 
our choices.”20  It is ethics reduced to epistemology, to a function of judgments 
and moral understanding.  Dora’s experience of “the inner monologue”21 was 
something that 20th century British philosophy does not accommodate.   
Murdoch insists that seeing, awareness or moral vision is prior to moral 
understanding.  It was what Toby, a young man who decided to spend a few 
days at Imber Court before his entrance to Oxford, had reflected on one time 
while on his way for a dip in the lake.  “Would it really be so difficult [to keep 
one’s innocence] if one were fully aware? The trouble with so many young 
people nowadays was that they were not aware.  They seemed to go through 
their youth in a daze, in a dream.”22  This is precisely what Murdoch is trying to 
wake us from, the petrifaction of an illusory stance in life where attention to 
particularity has been lost.  This is the “unseeing” of which she speaks of; the 
inability to be aware, to put one’s attention, to take a deliberate stance towards 
the encounter with particular reality, with truth.  Deliberate attention unfolds 
the motley dimensions of reality.  Michael experienced this whilst drinking at a 
pub, on the way back after purchasing the much debated mechanical cultivator.  
After hearing of Toby’s admiration of him, “Michael could not help catching, 
from the transfigured image of himself in the boy’s imagination, an 
invigorating sense of possibility . . ..  He looked sideways at Toby . . ..  He had 
none of that look of cunning, that rather nervous smartness that is often seen 
in boys of his age.  As Michael looked he felt hope for him, and with it the joy 
that comes from feeling, without consideration of oneself, hope for another.”23  
It is in seeing, in the real sense, that the subject is freed from egotism, 
transporting itself to the other’s irreducible presence, and even to the other’s 
nascent possibilities.24 As if to suggest a philosophical metaphor, we encounter 
the following scene in the novel where Toby and Michael do the “headlights 
experiment” to see if the human eyes, the organs for seeing, glow brightly like 
the feline eyes facing a beam of light.  Unfortunately, they “did not gleam or 
glow.”25   
                                                 
19 Cf.  Charles Taylor, “Iris Murdoch and Moral Philosophy,” in Iris Murdoch and the 
Search for Human Goodness, ed. by Maria Antonaccio and William Schweiker (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 3-28. 
20 “Our morality is, on the whole, conceptually simple.  We approach the world armed 
with certain general values which we hold simpliciter and without the assistance of metaphysics or 
dogmatic theology—respect for freedom, for truth, and so on.” Murdoch, Existentialists and 
Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 67. 
21 Ibid., 79. 
22 Murdoch, The Bell, 144. Emphasis added. 
23 Ibid., 154. 
24 Cf.  David J.  Gordon, “Iris Murdoch’s Comedies of Unselfing,” in Twentieth Century 
Literature, 36:2 (1990). 
25 Murdoch, The Bell, 159.  
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The exigencies of the good are beyond consideration of whether it’s 
more proper or not to offer one’s seat to an elderly, as it was in the case of 
Dora.  “There are things one doesn’t choose,” Dora comments later on in the 
novel.  “I don’t mean they’re forced on one.  But one doesn’t choose them.  
These are often the best things.”26  Things had to be done simply because they 
are.  It is this element of factuality of the ethical demand by which Murdoch 
brings ethics back to a certain metaphysical footing which “the current view” 
has made into an epistemological and prescriptive project.  Two things are 
noticeable in her approach; there is the metaphysical grounding, and the appeal 
to variegated experience, specifically of ordinary human pedestrian experience; 
human existence inclusive of the “overt manifestations of personal attitudes, 
speculations, or visions of life.”27 
 
Tragedy: Between Literature and Philosophy 
 
  An initial reading of the works of Iris Murdoch, especially in those 
sections dealing with her notion of literature may reveal that the tragic is but 
plainly a literary genre, and one that occupies a small place in the extensive 
horizon of the arts.  She comments that “[t]ragedy belongs only to art, where it 
occupies a very small area.”28 Another, she remarks that “[s]trictly speaking, 
tragedy belongs to literature;”29 it “belongs to art, and only to great art.”30 
However, a more careful reading of her works reveals that the tragic occupies 
not simply a small domain of literary interest, one that only a few poetic 
geniuses can create without falling into the pitfall of sentimentality.31 For 
Murdoch, literature is not simply literary.  It plays a vital link with philosophy 
for both of them are “truth-seeking and truth-revealing activities.”32 
Distinguished from the role of reason in philosophy, in literature, there is the 
innovative play of the imagination, in contrast to obsessive fantasy.  One may 
well argue that the distinction between philosophy and literature is simply 
formal.33 One is abstract, the other imaginative.  One is direct, goes straight to 
the philosophic problem; the other is indirect, it adumbrates reality without 
haste to disclose truths that we never thought we knew.  The arts is not simply 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 139. 
27 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 79. 
28 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 92. 
29 Ibid, 93. 
30 Ibid, 94. 
31 Murdoch avers, “The tragic art form is rare because it is difficult to keep attention 
focused on the truth without the author slipping into an easier sentimental, abstract, 
melodramatic (and so on) mode.  In the truthful vision evil is justly judged and misery candidly 
surveyed.” Ibid., 104. 
32 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 11. 
33 Peter Johnson notes that the peculiarity of Murdoch, among other philosophers who 
talk of literature, and in particular of novels, is that she maintains the boundary that exists 
between the two, “unwilling to discard all separation between philosophy and literature.” See 
Peter Johnson, Moral Philosophers and the Novel: A Study of Winch, Nussbaum and Rorty (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 5.  
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mimetic, it is also anamnetic.34 However, what connects philosophy with 
literature intimately, in terms of method, is that both of them are discursive.  
They both reveal the struggling intellect in its apprehension of reality.   
Discursiveness is the retrieval of the peripatetic in written form.  In the many forms of 
literature, this discursiveness is most characteristic of the novel,35 because it 
does not shackle itself with the strictures of conventional versification.  She 
elaborates 
 
The novel is the literary form best suited to . . . [forms of] 
free reflection, sad-comic and discursive truth-telling . . ..  
What it loses in hard-edged formal impact [of poetry], it 
gains in its grasp of detail, its freedom of tempo, its ability 
to be irrelevant, to reflect without haste upon persons and 
situations and in general to pursue what is contingent and 
incomplete.36 
  
It is the very discursiveness of the novel form that establishes the 
continuity of philosophy and literature, methodologically speaking.  Murdoch 
faced the problematic of modernity in the 20th century, the moral thinning of 
the irreducible subject, and this problematic she pursued along two parallel 
lines of approaches, philosophical and literary.37  
Treating of the comic and the tragic, one may initially conceive that in 
Murdoch the comic belongs to prose and the tragic to drama and poetry.   
Indeed, that the comic is unserious and the tragic serious.  She finds these 
distinctions peripheral.  For Murdoch, the comic is ubiquitous; it is in the air 
we breathe for all of us are artists.38 Tragedy’s domain is more restricted.  It 
belongs only to art, occupying a small area.  Tragedy, in short, is an artistic 
form, and only that.  It is surprising to read her say: “Real life is not tragic.”39 
Yes, that even the unspeakable horror of Auschwitz is not a tragedy.40 But, it is 
precisely this very mark of unspeakableness, of being lost for words that make 
reality un-tragic, or better yet, non-tragic, that makes Auschwitz non-tragic.  
She explains that in saying thus, “the extreme horrors of real life cannot be 
expressed in art.”41  To think of Auschwitz as tragic is the pretense of speaking 
the unspeakable. 
                                                 
34 Cf.  Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 12. 
35 “The novel form more frankly admits, indeed embraces, the instability of art and the 
invincible variety, contingency and scarcely communicable frightfulness of life.  The novel is a 
discursive art.” Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 96. 
36 Ibid., 93. 
37 It needs to be noted that her academic and literary careers developed and matured at 
the same time.  She was not a philosopher turned novelist, nor a novelist who abandoned the 
academe.  She was what may be genuinely called, a philosopher-novelist. 
38 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 92. 
39 Ibid., 93. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid.  
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Though art pictures reality for us (mimesis), though art instructs us 
(anamnesis), though art consoles us, it also lies to us.42 It deceives us; it is “a 
product of appearance not of reality.”43  There are elements in life that exceed 
expressions, rendering us speechless; there are elements in life, truths to which 
we only adumbrate, and though we engage ourselves in the consolations of 
literature, Murdoch warns that it must not lull us to fantasy, forgetting that 
though literature mirrors reality, it is only an imagined one.   
For Murdoch, the “true view of tragedy” is the combination of the 
Kantian sublime and the Hegelian reconfiguration of the tragic genre.44 Kant 
argues that in the sublime, the subject experiences the failure of the faculty of 
imagination to circumscribe a thin picture of totality (non-historical, non-social, 
non-human and quasi-mathematical) which is not given and to which the 
faculty of reason merely adumbrates.  The sublime, to cite an oft-repeated 
image of Murdoch, is a segment of a circle.  The subject experiences the thin 
Kantian abstracted totality as a broken circle, grasped by the imagination, but 
the rest of the circle is not given despite the demand of reason.45 Hegel 
humanized this abstracted thin totality of Kant, that is, it becomes concrete, 
inserted in history, and lodged in the social.46 In short, the abstraction of Kant 
receives particularity in Hegel.  Furthermore, Hegel reconfigured the tragic 
genre by insisting that the conflict in tragedy is not between good and evil, but 
between two incompatible goods.47 Murdoch argues that without these two 
qualifications, the humanization of totality and the conflict between two 
incompatible goods, there is “no complete ethical substance” in tragedy.48  
 
Tragic Freedom and the Concept of Love 
 
The Murdochian-twist in this scenario is the emphasis on freedom49, 
on the development of degrees of freedom.50 Kant provided the canvas, Hegel 
                                                 
42 “Sometimes, however, art which lies can also instruct.” Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide 
to Morals, 94.  “All art tends to console, as the presence of God consoles Job.” Ibid., 99. 
43 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 264. 
44 Ibid., 214. 
45 It needs to be noted that according to Murdoch, there is no place for tragedy in Kant.  
“Kant’s view of ethics contains no place for the idea of tragedy, so it is not surprising that he is 
unable to give an account of it in his aesthetics.” Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on 
Philosophy and Literature, 215.  Murdoch, however, gives the proviso that Kant’s theory of the 
sublime “ought” to be his idea of tragedy.  Cf. Ibid., 213. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Murdoch cites here Antigone and Creon.   
48 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 213. 
49 Murdoch argues that one may treat of freedom in five phases: (1) Tragic freedom, where 
freedom is an “exercise of the imagination in an unreconciled conflict of dissimilar beings.” 
Literary form is tragic drama.  (2) Medieval freedom, where “the individual is seen as a creature 
within a partly described hierarchy of theological reality.” Literary forms are religious tales, 
allegories and morality plays.  (3) Kantian freedom (Enlightenment), where the “individual is seen as 
a non-historical rational being moving towards complete agreement with other rational beings.” 
Literary forms are rationalistic tales, allegories and novels of ideas.  (4) Hegelian freedom (19th 
century) where “the individual is now thought of as part of a total historical society and takes his 
importance from his role in that society.” Literary form is the true novel.  (5) Romantic freedom  
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gave the design, but Murdoch executed the painting in the particularity of its 
details and the texture of its colors.  These elements emerge in the tragic genre 
in the exercise of freedom, the highest form of which is attentive love. 
The concept of love has a unique place in The Bell.  Dora, upon 
arriving at Imber Court noticed that an elaborate stone medallion hung above 
the doors on which are inscribed the words: Amor via mea, Love is my way.51  
Likewise, upon the discovery of the centuries-old bell submerged in the lake, 
Dora and Toby found along the rim of the bell the following inscribed words, 
Vox ego sum Amoris.  Gabriel vocor, I am the voice of love.  I am called Gabriel.52  
Dora herself was struck by the spectacle of the old bell, and “[a]ttending to it . . 
. she felt reverence for it, almost love.”53  It is interesting to notice that Gabriel 
was likewise the name for the new bell, Gabriel vocor.  However, it no longer 
bore the name of love.54 If indeed moral experience is a comportment 
characterized by seeing, by ethical awareness, Love is that by which this seeing 
is signified.  “Love is the perception of individuals.  Love is the extremely 
difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real.  Love . . . is the 
discovery of reality.”55  
Murdoch relates tragic freedom, “freedom as an exercise of the 
imagination in an unreconciled conflict of dissimilar beings,”56 with the 
concept of love.  The tragic safeguards the movement of love from ingesting 
external reality into subjectivity (neurosis), and likewise safeguards the subject 
such that in loving the other, the subject does not dissolve in the object loved 
(convention).  It appears that Murdoch, in emphasizing freedom, is criticizing 
certain modes of thought where the tragic involves the shackling of the moral 
subject, those instances where the tragic almost means the loss of self-
determination due to a spiral of events that the will cannot transcend.57  
 
 
                                                                                                                  
(19th and 20th centuries) where the “individual is seen as solitary and as having importance in and 
by itself.” Literary form is the neurotic modern novel.  See Ibid., 217. 
50 A.S.  Byatt argues that, in her classic study of the early fictions of Murdoch, the novels 
are revealed as studies of the degrees of freedom of the human subject, who, maintaining their 
freedom and individuality, had to relate to a rich and complicated world.  Cf. Byatt, Degrees of 
Freedom, 6. 
51 Murdoch, The Bell, 30. 
52 Ibid., 223. 
53 Ibid., 269.  This was also the experience of Paul when he saw the old bell.  Dora, finally 
abandoning her plans of “substituting” the new bell with the old one, decided to ring the bell in 
the middle of the night to make known to others the existence of this treasured discovery.  
People started to come to the barn and crowded around her, yet Paul, her husband “said nothing 
to her, he was too transported at seeing the bell.” Ibid., 272. 
54 On the new bell was inscribed the words: Defunctos ploro, vivos voco, fulmina frango. 
55 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 215.  Cf. also 
Sharon Kaehele and Howard German, “The Discovery of Reality in Iris Murdoch’s The Bell,” in 
PMLA, 82:7 (1967). 
56 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 217. 
57 Cf. Kaehele and German, “The Discovery of Reality in Iris Murdoch’s The Bell,” 562.  
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Tragedy as a Function of Attentive Love: Beyond 
Convention and Neurosis 
 
  Herein lies the moral critique of Murdoch, the loss of freedom in the 
fold of externality and internality, the two enemies of love: “social convention 
and neurosis.”58  If indeed the old bell is named the voice of Love, one may, by 
extension, say that the novel is about Love itself, albeit a tragic one.  How 
these two enemies of love are exemplified in the novel supply the conflict in 
the plot.  The picture of convention is neatly illustrated in the homily of James 
Tayper Pace, a member of the Imber Court and second in responsibility to 
Michael Mead, speaking about “the chief requirement of the good life.”  James’ 
talk echoes Murdoch’s preoccupation with morality as a growth towards 
unselfing, towards greater degrees of freedom, especially when he remarks that 
the chief requirement of the good life is “to live without any image of 
oneself.”59  However, that is as far as it goes since his view of the good life is 
precisely what Murdoch herself is vigorously attacking: a prescriptive ethics, a 
morality of rules and codes of conduct.  “Surely we know enough and more 
than enough rules to live by”;60 “We should think of our actions and look to 
God and to His Law.  We should consider not what delights us or what 
disgusts us, morally speaking, but what is enjoined and what is forbidden.”61  
The just man (iustus ex fide vivit) “does not amend the rules by the standards of 
this world.”62  The rule-based ethics logically necessitates an ethic of 
conformity to practices and compliance to mores.  In the words of Mrs. Mark, 
commenting on Dora’s abortive effort at decorating the couple’s room, “I 
thought I should tell you, though, for the next time.  I feel sure you’d rather be 
treated like one of us, wouldn’t you, and keep the rules of the house? It’s not 
like a hotel and we do expect our guests to fit in—and I think that’s what they 
like best too.”63 That is what the codes exactly demand, that one “fits in.” In 
another earlier instance, at Dora’s initiation to the spiritual practices of the lay 
group, the extern nun, Sister Ursula, took notice of Dora kneeling at the 
makeshift chapel unveiled.  Again, Mrs. Mark enters the scene saying: “Sister 
Ursula says please would you mind covering your head? It’s customary here.”64  
For lack of anything better to use, Dora resigned to using “a small not very 
clean handkerchief.”65  In the novel, Dora seems to be the prime victim of this 
“exigency of convention.” James, who admits that he has “very little time for 
                                                 
58 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 216. 
59 Murdoch, The Bell, 132. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid., 133. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 61.  Mrs. Mark later in the novel adds: “We live by rules ourselves and if our 
guests just don’t there’ll be chaos, won’t there? It stands to reason.  I know this sounds awfully 
dull and sober—and I’m sure your London friends would think we were a very stuffy lot.  But 
trying to live up to ideals does often make one look ridiculous.” Ibid., 244. 
64 Ibid., 64. 
65 Ibid., 34.  
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[someone] who finds his life too complicated and special for the ordinary rules 
to fit” ends up calling her a “bitch.”66   
In convention, the individual subject disappears in the surface of the 
external environment; one joins on the bandwagon of social pressure; one 
becomes a fashion victim.  In Murdoch’s philosophy, there is a heightened 
awareness of having to exist as an irreducible subject.  At the beginning of the 
novel, one encounters Dora looking at her image on a mirror realizing that 
despite the overpowering presence of Paul in her life, a presence to which she 
drew life, and at the same time drains her of it, beyond the disturbing 
vacillation, she is still herself, a person “unknown to Paul.” She thought, “How 
very much, after all, she existed; she, Dora, and no one should destroy her.”67  
The main distinctive resolution of Dora, at the end of the novel, her moral 
crest, was the insight that “[a]s things were, she felt that she would never 
manage to live with Paul until she could treat with him, in some sense, as an 
equal . . ..  She felt intensely the need and somehow now the capacity to live 
and work on her own and become, what she had never been, an independent 
grown-up person.”68  However, this moment of resolve was a hard-earned 
reward.  In staying at Imber Court, she “felt organised and shut in.”69  Dora 
could not stand other people knowing of her life, of her faults and infidelities 
to Paul.  She knew that if others knew of her intimately, they would disapprove 
of her, condemn her, judge her.  It was this imposing tribunal scenario to 
which her immediate reaction was self-assertion by the performance of 
something truly Dora-like: to “take the train to London,”70 to flee and escape 
from the unspoken yet palpable condemnation of the surrounding people.  She 
had to find healing in the “anonymity of London.”71   
Neurosis, on the other hand, is the disappearance of the external 
world, swallowed up by the solipsistic ego; the other subject becomes an 
extension of the self, the instrumentalization by the transcendental ego.  Again, 
we encounter an episode of neurosis in the person of Dora.  After the interlude 
of experiencing a new world different from her usual environment, after the 
respite from quarrels with her husband, and after furtively sizing up all the 
other members of the community, Dora once more felt being gauged and 
judged by them.  In Murdoch’s psychological analysis, neurosis is the flipside 
of social convention.  When the feeling is intense, of being organized and shut 
in, the external world collapses in solipsistic bouts.  Waking up one day, Dora 
experienced, now more intensely, the illusory encroaching presence of the 
community, with its attendant judgment on her lack of moral uprightness: 
“they looked to her hostile and censorious.”72  Looking at the mirror in her 
room, and then leaning out of the window, seeing the sun, the lake, and the 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 230. 
67 Ibid., 45. 
68 Ibid., 305. 
69 Ibid., 183. 
70 Ibid., 184. 
71 Ibid., 185. 
72 Ibid., 193.  
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Norman tower of the Abbey, she “had the odd feeling that all this was inside 
her head.  There was no way of breaking into this scene, for it was all 
imaginary.  Rather startled at this feeling, she began to dress and tried to think 
about something practical.  But the dazed feeling of unreality continued.  It was 
as if her consciousness had eaten up its surroundings.  Everything was now 
subjective.  Even, she remembered, Paul this morning had been subjective.”73  
Neurosis is consciousness eating up its surroundings, the disastrous implosion 
of the external into the internal.  More specifically, Murdoch calls it the 
“mechanical repetitive imprisoning of the mind.”74 
It is interesting that though Dora experienced instances of both social 
convention and neurosis, Murdoch did not place upon her the sad ultimate 
judgment of the two enemies of love.  Rather, this we find in the Fawley twins.  
It was Nick, the rogue who could not fit into the society and who found 
himself at Imber Court in the failed hope of starting a new life, who ended up 
committing suicide.  His sister Catherine, who planned to join the enclosed 
community of nuns, but who, for the time being, decided to join the lay 
community as a place of transition, ended up losing her mind, tried to drown 
herself in the lake, and later found herself in a psychiatric ward in London, all 
because of the unrequited love for Michael.   
At the conclusion of the novel, we find the crucial denouement in 
Dora and Michael who, after the spin of unexpected events, understood 
themselves better in relation to other people and the events that transpired.  
They were not the heroes in the novel, nor was the Imber Court the 
incarnation of the adversary.  The novel was simply a narration of peculiar 
events that border between the real and odd.  A tragic reading of The Bell veers 
us away from the classical conception that tragedy is about a certain hero, a 
demi-god, a more than ordinary human individual who collapses under his or 
her own hamartia.  Although it may appear that Dora plays the heroine in the 
novel, the deliberate effort to spread out the evolution of characters in the 
novel hint at an effort to transcend the literary dual requirement of the hero 
and the foe.  Indeed, one could not even pinpoint who or what exactly is the 
enemy in the novel.  This is the realism that Murdoch tries to portray in her 
novels.  There is a feeling of fantasy and eeriness, but as she would say, the 
ordinary passer-by is rather eccentric.   
We can see now how the concept of love and the tragic are closely 
related.  Tragedy is an art where imagination is more dominantly at work, and 
love is “an exercise of the imagination.”75 The idea of tragic freedom and that 
of love have the same enemies, convention and neurosis.  The conquest of 
both love and tragic freedom are the same, the reconciliation of the revealed 
irreducible particularity.  Speaking of tragic freedom, Murdoch writes,  
 
                                                 
73 Ibid., 183.  Dora thought: “When the world had seemed to be subjective it had seemed 
to be without interest or value.” Ibid., 192. 
74 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 139. 
75 Murdoch, Existentialists and Mystics: Writing on Philosophy and Literature, 216.  
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The tragic freedom implied by love is this: that we all 
have an indefinitely extended capacity to imagine the 
being of others.  Tragic, because there is no prefabricated 
harmony, and others are, to an extent we never cease 
discovering, different from ourselves.  Nor is there any 
social totality within which we can come to comprehend 
differences as placed and reconciled.  We have only a 
segment of the circle.  Freedom is exercised in the 
confrontation by each other, in the context of an 
infinitely extensible work of imaginative understanding, 
of two irreducible dissimilar individuals.  Love is the 
imaginative recognition of, that is respect for, this 
otherness.76 
 
If in love we apprehend difference, tragedy is the movement of 
irreconcilability between conflicting dissimilar particularities.  There is no 
reconciliation because unlike Hegel, there is no external prefabricated harmony 
in the Murdochian world.  It is this absence of external prefabricated harmony, 
of the telos, that made Murdoch say that a great tragedy “leaves us in eternal 
doubt.”77 The subject collides with the irreducible otherness, yet becomes a 
victor in its own irreducibility: “the human spirit mourning and yet exulting in 
its strength.”78 This is the particularity of the tragic genre, it is Janus-faced: 
triumph and defeat.   
 
“Tragedy of the Divine” 
 
  Tragedy is not only closely linked to love, but also to religion.  Or 
better yet, it is precisely because of this link with love that tragedy entails entry 
into the religious dimension.79 It is not because tragedy requires the fact of 
contingency and death, that religion enters into the scene as that hegemonic 
whole where these two find a transcendent consoling meaning.  Rather, tragedy 
and religion are linked because both entail dying, or forms of dying.  “Tragedy, 
like religion, must break the ego, destroying the illusory whole of the unified 
self.”80 When tragedy, because of its topic of contingency and death, distresses 
us, the drama of the ethical is raised to the religious level.81 It is able “to carry a 
religious message.”82 
The Murdochian world is a broken universe, and aesthetics (arts, tragic 
form), ethics (love) and the religious (belief, God) are forms that freedom 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., 219. 
78 Ibid., 220. 
79 Cf. Janet Martin Soskice, “Love and Attention,” in Philosophy, Religion and the Spiritual 
Life, ed. by Michael McGhee (Oxford: The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 1992), 59. 
80 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 104. 
81 Ibid., 117. 
82 Ibid., 92.  
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imposes upon the experienced totality, all of which entail a manner of 
consoling scheme to which the subject tiptoes along an existential tightrope 
that separates convention and neurosis.  Tragedy carries ethics to religion.   
There is something in religion, a sense of universality, or better yet, of the 
absolute or ultimate, to which Murdoch appeals, and to which she brings her 
ethical theory.  This is reflected in her appreciation of Schopenhauer’s view of 
the tragic and its metaphysical nature, that tragedy is engraved into “the 
structure of the world.”83 Improving upon Hegel’s reconfiguration of the 
tragic, Schopenhauer argues that it must also involve something of “necessary 
evil.” Murdoch elaborates, 
 
Schopenhauer says that tragic catastrophe is occasioned 
by ‘original sin’84, and he suggests what that is like when 
he speaks of ordinary, not necessarily very wicked, people 
coming to a point where they knowingly and inevitably 
damage each other and cause the innocent to suffer, a 
point where evil seems inevitable, necessary, even a kind 
of duty.85 
 
Following this line of thought, it may even be suggested that the tragic 
is a key concept in Murdoch’s moral philosophy86, for in the tragic, ethics 
elevated to the religious, the Good is revealed, undisclosed in its metaphysical 
significance.  The tragic is a concept that is not simply limited within the 
literary arts.  It plays a role extending across the spectrum of aesthetics, ethics 
and the religious.  All three disciplines impose form in the Murdochian broken 
world, bringing, with the realization of the decrepitude of existence, a grain of 
non-illusory consolation.  Tragedy is that function whereby none of the three 
approaches falls into sentimentality (aesthetics), fantasy (ethics) and magic 
(religion).87  
Our present problem, however, is to distinguish between genuine 
religion and comforting mythology.88 If mythology comforts by concealing the 
factuality of death and absolute contingency of existence, true religion must 
function the other way.  True religion, must play the tragic role of goading us 
to the fact that existence is a broken circle.  Mythical religion slips easily to 
illusory comfort in the face of the horrors of life.  In the novel, this is chiefly 
exemplified in the reading of The Revelations of Julian of Norwich immediately 
after Toby’s idyllic view of reality was shattered by Michael’s inadvertent kiss.  
While Catherine reads the words: “I shall save my word in all things and I shall make 
                                                 
83 Ibid., 101. 
84 Schopenhauer calls this original sin as “the crime of existence itself.” Cf. Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Cf.  Pamela M.  Hall, “Limits of the Story: Tragedy in Recent Virtue Ethics,” in Studies 
in Christian Ethics, 17:3 (2004). 
87 “Shakespeare’s (true) tragic understanding that religion, especially and essentially, must 
not be consolation (magic).  Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 120. 
88 Cf. Ibid., 139.  
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all things well,” Toby was not listening, pondering instead on “one of the earliest 
lessons of adult life: that one is never secure.”89 
We can retreat to nowhere in the face of the exigency of seeing “the 
truth which is held up before us.”90 Religion must help us face this absolute, 
the absoluteness of suffering, of brokenness, which is the realization of the 
i d e a  o f  d e a t h .   Y e t ,  i n  s o  d o i n g ,  r e ligion must not fall into the magic of 
mythology; “an atmosphere of magic is alien to tragedy as it is to true 
religion.”91 
She finds in the idea of God, especially that of God the Father, the 
image of a consoling external person that distracts us from the ultimacy of 
contingency and death, “that living God in whom all pain is healed and all evil 
finally overcome.”92  There is no place for God in the tragic drama.  Unless 
God relinquishes the role in the play, the drama is less tragic, if not ultimately a 
comedy.  Quoting the Christian mystics Meister Eckhart and St.  John of the 
Cross, Murdoch says that “[i]n the end we give up everything, including 
God.”93 Otherwise, religion remains a heteronomous religion.94 “Every man his 
own theologian.”95 For Murdoch, true religion is a “religion without God.”96 
The Bell is not simply a philosophical or psychological novel but also a 
religious one.  It is not because it talks about an Anglican community of 
enclosed nuns and lay religious that makes it into a religious novel.  One needs 
to see through the symbolism of that singular object on whose existence the 
whole tale unfolds.  This is the ancient bell that “flew like a bird out of the 
tower and fell into the lake”97 after the community of enclosed nuns was put 
into curse by the local bishop when no nun presented herself as that fallen 
religious who took in a lover.  After the fall of the bell, the guilty religious 
drowned herself into the lake.98  
In major religions, especially Christianity, the bell plays an exceedingly 
important role.99 It was a symbol of God summoning His people to Himself.  
                                                 
89 Murdoch, The Bell, 160-61 also cf. 209. 
90 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 140. 
91 Ibid., 141. 
92 Murdoch, The Bell, 81. 
93 Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, 91. 
94 Ibid., 137. 
95 Ibid., 135. 
96 Cf.  Franklin Gamwell, “On the Loss of Theism,” in Iris Murdoch and the Search for 
Human Goodness, ed. by Maria Antonaccio and William Schweiker (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 171-89.  Cf. also Peter Byrne, The Moral Interpretation of Religion, Reason and 
Religion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 105-25.  A more sympathetic reading of 
Murdoch’s “theology” is in Maria Antonaccio, “Iris Murdoch’s Secular Theology of Culture,” in 
Literature & Theology, 18:3 (2004). 
97 Murdoch, The Bell, 42. 
98 Cf. another reading of The Bell as an allegory of felix culpa, David W.  Beams, “The 
Fortunate Fall: Three Actions in the Bell,” in Twentieth Century Literature, 34:4 (1988), in particular 
421ff. 
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In biblical times, it was used for the purpose of (1) making joyful noise to God, and (2) to ward  
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The bell speaks, calls, shouts.  Michael took the booming sound of the bell as 
an ominous sign of an impending death.100  Dora’s emotionally charged 
encounter with the bell, the night before its intended “switching,” intricately 
describes an almost religious experience of another being, which, unlike the 
portraits in the National Gallery that leave her be, enters into a relationship, a 
bond with her.  She “felt reverence for it, almost love,”101 thinking that she was 
its master, the role was reversed, “it was mastering her and would have its will.” 
Despite the failure of her and Toby’s plan, she could not just let it be, remain 
indifferent to it; “she could not leave the bell ambiguously to be the subject of 
malicious and untrue stories.”102  However, the bell could not be indifferent to 
her also; it needed her.  As if having understood this vocation, Dora hurled 
herself with all her might against it, and continued to do so, realizing that her 
sole purpose now was “of keeping the bell ringing.”103 
In the Christian tradition, the practice of baptizing Church tower bells, 
that is, giving names signifies the importance of the bell.  The novel itself 
reflects this when the two bells are both notably named Gabriel (meaning, “the 
messenger of God”).  Furthermore, at the arrival of the new bell to replace the 
old one that was lost in the lake, the enclosed nuns will receive the bell the 
same way as they receive a postulant into their community, that is, through the 
great door of the monastery, at seven in the morning, with the bell decorated 
as a bride.  However, for one to understand the drama of religious symbolism 
used by Murdoch, one needs to call to mind a host of distinguishing features of 
the two bells. 
Though both of them are named Gabriel, certain significations are also 
engraved in the bells.  The old one describes itself in the simplicity of attentive 
love: Vox ego sum Amoris, I am the voice of Love.104  The other Defunctos ploro, 
vivos voco, fulmina frango, I lament the deceased, I summon the living, I send out 
lightning105 takes on the air of impartiality and final judgment.  Furthermore, 
there were some scenes in the life of Christ engraved in the old bell that added 
more particularity, elaborateness and uniqueness to the old bell, something that 
the new bell no longer has: “Its surface was plain, except for a band of 
arabesques which circled it a little above the rim.”106  Two symbols that appear 
to suggest that the old Gabriel was announcing love exemplified in the life of 
Christ, the new Gabriel, the new messenger, was announcing the insipidity of 
mourning for the dead, imploring the living, but a judgment on both, all of 
which in the “plain surface” of a God-less faith. 
                                                                                                                  
off evil spirits.  In Christianity, the use of the bell dates back to the fifth century when St.  
Paulinus of Nola introduced its use to summon the monks for religious services.  Later on, it was 
approved for use to call the faithful to Mass in the Church. 
100 Cf. Murdoch, The Bell, 225.  
101 Ibid., 269. 
102 Ibid., 270. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., 223. 
105 Ibid., 242. 
106 Ibid.  
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In the two homilies, though James and Michael both spoke of the 
requirement of the good life, their view of it diverged; and though both utilized 
the imagery of the bell to tell a point, they were telling divergent points.  For 
James the bell is an image of the marks of innocence to which we all need to 
cling, over that of the human desire to seek experience.  He remarks,  
 
A bell is made to speak out.  What would be the value of 
a bell which was never rung? It rings out clearly, it bears 
witness, it cannot speak without seeming like a call, a 
summons.  A great bell is not to be silenced.  Consider 
too its simplicity.  There is no hidden mechanism.  All 
that it is is plain and open; and if it is moved it must 
ring.107 
 
The irony enters the scene when James relates the bell to Catherine 
Fawley, who, like the bell entering the great door of the Abbey as a postulant, 
is entering the enclosed nuns sometime soon.  The simplicity to which James 
refers, that there is nothing hidden in it, is all laid bare as only apparent.   
Indeed, in the eyes of the community Catherine bore the same marks of 
innocence, simplicity and transparency that the bell bears.  However, this 
changed when the new bell fell into the lake.  Catherine herself took it as a sign 
of her unworthiness to be a nun, and the later disclosure of what she really was, 
and the things that lie hidden deep in her heart.   
For Michael, also speaking of the requirement of the good life, one has 
to attain a certain degree of self-knowledge, “some conception of one’s 
capacities.”108  As James speaks on the level of universals, on that which should 
be in all cases, Michael addresses himself in the plane of the particularities of 
human uniqueness and individuality: “Each one of us has his own way of 
apprehending God.”109  No two persons are the same and as such, “God 
speaks to us in various tongues.  To this, we must be attentive.”110  Michael’s 
approach was touched by his own experience of frailty (having had a 
homosexual relation with Nick early on in his career, and then the inadvertent 
kiss with Toby).  Both in innocence and one’s way back to it, one must muster 
great strength, and “to use our strength we must know where it lies.”111  The 
same image of the bell is illustrated: 
 
The bell is subject to the force of gravity.112 The swing 
that takes it down must also take it up.  So we must learn 
to understand the mechanism of our spiritual energy, and 
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highlights Simone Weil’s influence on her thought, especially on the area of religion.    
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find out where, for us, are the hiding places of our 
strength.113 
 
Michael and Dora embody this pivotal finale realizing that for them to 
live the good life, they must see, must attentively be aware of, who they are and 
what their places are in the changing scheme of things.  It is interesting to note 
that between the two, in their grasp of the truth, there remains the ubiquitous 
undertone of the irreducibility of the subject.  Dora decided not to return (yet) 
to Paul, and instead must first seek being “an independent grown-up 
person.”114  For Michael, the case was more intricate.  He realized his own lack 
of unselfing.  He was afraid to love and abandoned the hope that a single love 
could bring may have staved off the tragic death of Nick.  With the tragedy 
came the conclusion that he had never believed at all: “The pattern which he 
had seen in his life had existed only in his own romantic imagination.”115  His 
final profession of faith: “there is a God, but I do not believe in Him.”116 
This statement briefly sums up what the “tragedy of the divine” really 
is and the self-defeating tragedy in the tragic of Murdoch.  Her moral vision 
falls short of being a religious vision.  Murdoch’s effort to maintain the dual 
irreducibility of the subject and the other collapses in the topography of the 
Divine.   
It is at this point that we encounter to the internal tragedy in the tragic of 
Murdoch.  She structured a system of seeing, that is attentive love, whereby 
otherness and subjectivity are affirmed without the one collapsing into the 
other by the function of the tragic.  However, when it comes to religious seeing, 
when she carries her ethics to the level of the religious, a flattening of religious 
categories ensues revealing that in Murdoch, one encounters a mere 
instrumentalization of religious types to modify and enhance her moral 
arguments.  Ultimately, she doesn’t offer a moral interpretation of religion.  It 
is a religious interpretation of morality or what Gordon Graham aptly calls, her 
“spiritualised morality.”117  
 
Conclusion 
 
The logic of internal tragedy in the novel, and in the philosophy of 
Murdoch, rests precisely on her effort to come up with a metaphysical view of 
reality, founded on Platonic moralism, that respects the irreducible particularity 
of entities, of the subject and the other, that populate the Murdochian universe.  
This she summarized in her view of attentive love, and how tragedy functions 
as a kind of “reality-check” lest love infolds into convention or neurosis.  The 
tragic is then not simply a literary genre, but extends beyond her literary world 
                                                 
113 Murdoch, The Bell, 205. 
114 Ibid., 305. 
115 Ibid., 312. 
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117 Cf. Gordon Graham, “Spiritualized Morality and Traditional Religion,” in Ratio, 9 
(1996), 78.  See also, Byrne, The Moral Interpretation of Religion, 96.  
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towards that view of metaphysics founded on a moral vision.  Her novels are 
pictures of how she conceived of the world, philosophically.  Tragedy enters 
into her metaphysical scheme, disclosing the brokenness of existence.  Tragedy 
brings ethics to the terrain of the ultimate, to that of the religious, yet on this 
divine topography, her metaphysics of attentive love infolds into a religious 
solipsism, the collapse of the religious Other into the subject’s internality: “We 
must now also internalise our God.”118  The divine tragedy is that we need to 
rouse ourselves from sleep and realize that our “God” is but a dream of which 
the “Good” is reality.  To retrieve the Good, we must displace God.  Murdoch 
argues that God cannot be a character in the novel, for unless He relinquishes 
his role, the tale is never tragic enough.  However, what this “relinquishing” 
involves is not the removal of God in the drama of existence.  Classical tragedy 
portrays heroes and heroines in the grip of iron fate which is the will of the 
gods.  In Murdoch’s genre, we find a reversal—that even the gods fall doom to 
the will of human beings.  The relinquishing of role that Murdoch necessitates 
in the tragic is not the removal, but the replacement, of God.  The Bell is a 
religious tragedy, a tragedy of the divine, precisely because the old bell, the very 
image of the religious Other, is replaced.  The miracle of substituting the newly 
arrived one with the centuries old bell did not come to pass, even if the new 
one fell into the same lake.  The fate of the old bell, that one called Love, 
whose “truth-telling voice [could] not be silenced,”119 ends up in one of the 
solitary halls of “the British Museum”120 attentively waiting for the more 
curious passerby.   
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